Let’s assume that seemings are sui generis propositional attitudes that have a truthlike feel. On this view, seemings are distinct mental states from beliefs and other propositional attitudes. It at least seems conceivable to me that there could be a being that has many of the same sorts of mental states that we have except for seemings. I’ll call this being a seemings zombie.
The seemings zombie never has mental states where a proposition is presented to it as true in the sense that it has a truthlike feel. Would such a being engage in philosophical theorizing if presented with the opportunity? I’m not entirely sure whether the seemings zombie would have the right sort of motivation to engage in philosophizing. If we need seemings or something similar to them to motivate philosophical theorizing, then seemings zombies won’t be motivated to do it.
But do we need seemings to motivate philosophizing? I think we might need them if philosophizing includes some sort of commitment to a particular view. What could motivate us to adopt a particular view in philosophy besides the fact that that view seems true to us? I guess we could be motivated by the wealth and fame that comes along with being a professional philosopher, but I’m skeptical.
Maybe we don’t need to adopt a particular view to philosophize. In that case we could say that seemings zombies can philosophize without anything seeming true to them. They could be curious about conceptual connections or entailments of theories articulated by the great thinkers, and that could be sufficient to move them to philosophize. I’m not sure whether or not this would qualify as philosophizing in the sense many of us are acquainted with. Even people whose careers consist of the study of a historical figure’s intellectual works seem to commit themselves to a particular view about that figure. Kant interpreters have views about what Kant thought or argued for, and my guess is those views seem true to those interpreters.
The seemings zombies might still be able to philosophize, though. Maybe they would end up as skeptics, looking down on all of us doing philosophy motivated by seemings. We seemings havers end up being motivated by mental states whose connection to the subject matter they are motivating us to take stances on are tenuous at best. The seemings zombies would then adopt skeptical attitudes towards our philosophical views. But I’m still worried, because skeptics like to give us arguments for their views about knowledge, and my guess is a lot of sincere skeptics are motivated by the fact that skepticism seems true to them. I could just be naive, though; there may be skeptics who remain uncommitted to any philosophical view, including their skepticism. I’m just not sure how that’s supposed to work.
One reaction you might have to all of this is to think that seemings zombies are incoherent or not even prima facie conceivable. That may be true, but it doesn’t seem that way to me.