What I'm Currently Working On

I haven’t uploaded anything to this blog in a while so I figured I would post a brief overview of what I’ve been thinking about and working on. I should start regularly uploading normal blog posts soon.

My current research is almost entirely based on a theory of belief formation and its implications for epistemology, rationality, and Streumer’s argument that we can’t believe a global normative error theory.

The theory of belief formation that I’m working with is called the Spinozan theory. The theory is situated as an alternative to the Cartesian theory of belief formation. The Spinozan theory says that we automatically form a belief that p whenever we consider that p. This means that the process of belief formation is automatic and outside of our conscious control. This theory has serious implications for several areas, such as rationality and epistemology.

In terms of epistemology, lots of philosophers working in that area will talk about belief formation in ways that presuppose a Cartesian theory. The Cartesian theory says that the process of belief formation and the process of belief revision are on par; both are within our conscious control. When we form a belief we base it on considerations like evidence. We consider the evidence for and against the proposition and then we form a belief. However, if the Spinozan theory is true then this is a misrepresentation of how we actually form beliefs. According to the Spinozan, we automatically form a belief whenever we consider a proposition. We may be able to revise our beliefs with conscious effort, but that process requires more mental energy than the process of forming a belief. If the Spinozan is right, we need to investigate whether or not we can do without talk of control over belief formation in epistemology.

The Spinozan theory entails that we believe lots of contradictory things. That we believe lots of contradictory things runs contrary to our ordinary view of ourselves as relatively rational creatures who do their best not to hold inconsistent beliefs. If any plausible account of rationality requires at least a lot of consistency among our beliefs, then we’re pretty screwed. But we might be able to work with a revisionary account of rationality that sees being rational as a constant process of pruning the contradictory beliefs from one’s mind through counterevidence. The problem with that sort of account, though, is that belief revision is an effortful process that is sensitive to cognitive load effects, whereas belief formation is automatic will occur whenever one considers a proposition. So, we’ll basically be on a rationality treadmill, especially in our current society where we’re bombarded with things that induce cognitive load effects.

Another project that I’m going to start working on is applying the Spinozan theory to propaganda. I think that somebody interested in designing very effective propaganda should utilize the Spinozan theory. For example, knowing that belief formation is automatic and occurs whenever a person considers a proposition would help one design some pretty effective propaganda, since one’s beliefs can root themselves in their mental processes such that they influence one’s behavior over time. If you throw in some cognitive load enhancing effects then you can make it more difficult for people to resist keeping their newly formed beliefs.

The last project I’m currently working on is a paper in which I argue against Bart Streumer’s case against believing the error theory. According to Streumer, one cannot believe a global normative error theory because one would believe that one has no reason to believe it, which we can’t do according to him. I think that if we work with the Spinozan theory then this is clearly false, since we automatically form beliefs about things that we have no reason to believe. My guess is that proponents of Streumer’s view will push back by arguing that they are talking about something different than I am when they use the word, “belief”. But I think that the Spinozan theory tracks the non-negotiable features of our ordinary conceptions of belief enough to qualify as an account of belief in the ordinary sense.

For those interested in the Spinozan theory, click this link. I should be regularly uploading posts here soon.