Mental Incorrigibility and Higher Order Seemings

Suppose that the phenomenal view of seemings is true. So, for it to seem to S that P, S must have a propositional attitude towards P that comes with a truthlike feel. Now suppose that we are not infallible when it comes to our own mental states. We cannot be absolutely certain that we are in a certain mental state. So, we can make mistakes when we judge whether or not it seems to us that P.

Now put it all together. In cases where S judges that it seems to her that P, but she is mistaken, what is going on? Did it actually seem to her that P or did she mistakenly judge that it did? If it’s the former, then it is unclear to me how S could mistakenly judge that it seems to her that P. Seeming states on the phenomenal view seem to be the sorts of mental states we should be aware of when we experience them. If it's the latter, then it is unclear whether higher order seemings can solve our problem.

If a subject is experiencing a seeming state and judges that it seems to her that P, then there has to be some sort of luck going on that disconnects the seeming state from her judgment such that she does not know that it seems to her that P. Maybe she’s very distracted when she focuses her awareness onto her seeming state to form her judgment and that generates the discrepancy. I’m not really sure how plausible such a proposal would ultimately be. Instead, if the subject is not actually in a seeming state, then we need to explain what is going on when she mistakenly judges that she is in one. One possibility is that there are higher order seemings. Such seemings take first order seemings as their contents. On this view, it could seem to us that it seems that P is the case.

The idea of higher order seemings repulses me, but it could be true. Or, in a more reductionist spirit, we could say that higher order seemings are just a form of introspective awareness of our first order seemings. But I am worried that such a proposal would reintroduce the original problem linked to fallibility. If I can mistakenly judge that it seems to be that it seems to me that P, then what is going on with that higher order (introspective) seeming? The issue seems to come back to bite us in the ass. But it might do that on any proposal about higher order seemings, assuming we have accepted that we are not infallible mental state detectors. Maybe we just need to accept a regress of seemings, or maybe we should stop talking about them. Like always, I’ll just throw my hands up in the air and get distracted by a different issue rather than come up with a concrete solution.

An Introduction to Morality and Emotions

When doing moral theory, the question of emotion will inevitably arise. Some theorists think that emotions should not play any role because they are antithetical to reliable moral reasoning. Others doubt that emotions are a wholly distorting influence. In this post, I’m going to lay out some ways in which emotions may feature in our theorizing about morality.

A popular view of emotion is to take them as intentional states that present their objects in an evaluative light. For instance, being happy about graduating from college is to have the state of affairs of graduating from college being presented to a subject such that she has certain positive feelings towards it. The way in which this view of emotion can be relevant to moral theorizing is when the object of emotion is a moral state of affairs. Your emotions get moralized in this sense when they are about moral states of affairs.

Another way in which emotions are relevant to morality is if they provide us access to moral facts. If emotions are our means of epistemic contact with moral reality, then emotions are epistemically relevant to morality. Emotions may then be ways of representing states of affairs with a certain sensitivity to morally salient features of what’s being represented. One simplistic possibility is that our emotional reaction to the idea of pushing a man off a bridge to stop a train that is headed for five people tied to the track provides us with epistemic access to the separateness of persons, which explains why it’s wrong to push the man to his death.

However, there may be a flip-side to the epistemic view of emotions. Emotions could also distort our sensitivity to morally salient features of states of affairs. Peter Singer has defended a view similar to this when he argued that deontological intuitions are subject to distorting influences rooted in our evolutionary development.

Emotions can also be the ways in which we are motivated to act morally. It could be the case that we need emotions to move us to act morally, which would make emotions necessary for moral action. On this view, a robot with the set of true moral beliefs would be unmoved to act on them if it is incapable of experiencing emotions. Mere belief is insufficient on this account of moral emotions.

We may also be subject to evaluation based on the emotions we experience. There are clearly good and bad ways to behave at a funeral. If somebody began laughing uncontrollably, we would probably consider that to be inappropriate, whereas we would be tolerant of grieving in the form of loud crying. A similar view is defended by Justin D’Arms and Daniel Jacobson.

One last way that emotions can be relevant to moral theorizing is if they are integral to our moral development. Perhaps eliciting certain emotions is a necessary means of moral education. Making developing moral agents experience things like guilt over wrongdoing by pointing out how they’ve let a loved one down could be formative for them. In this sense, emotions are part of the development of moral agents.

There are probably other ways in which emotions are morally relevant that I’ve missed. If you are aware of any more, let me know in the comments section below.